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Abstract 
This paper analyses the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich tax 
structures used by large multinational enterprises. These structures 
enable companies to shift significant profits to offshore tax havens 
through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries in Ireland and the 
Netherlands.  Application of the New Zealand General Anti-
Avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 reveals that any 
attempt to counteract these structures would be highly fact dependent.  
The paper concludes that it would be possible to apply the rule, but 
that there would be practical difficulties in relation to enforceability 
of the Commissioner’s ruling.  A similar result was reached when 
applying the United States General Anti-Avoidance rule. The 
attempted application of the General Anti-Avoidance rules reveals a 
fundamental flaw in the income tax system.  That is, the inability of the 
current system to regulate and control intangible resources and 
technology based transactions. 
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I Introduction 
In the late 20th century and into the 21st century several fundamental 
changes have occurred in the way we do business.  The rise of the 
multinational enterprise has led to trading on a truly global level.  
Companies are now able to set up subsidiaries and branches wherever 5 
they wish.  Technological developments have a twofold effect here.  
First, the rise of the internet has enabled agreements and transactions 
to be made instantaneously.  Secondly, any new technologies require 
intellectual property protection.  Thus, there is an abundance of 
intangible intellectual property assets that previously did not make a 10 
substantial contribution to the economy. The combination of 
technological developments and the abundance of intellectual property 
means the business world no longer resembles the environment many 
of our laws were designed to deal with.  Amongst these is income tax 
law.  The fundamentals of the western income tax system were 15 
formulated at a time where it was easier to keep track of trade, and 
thus income could be easily assessed.  Trade generally encompassed 
some form of physical transfer of goods, and the tangible nature of 
these transactions meant that regulation of income tax was relatively 
straightforward. 20 
By contrast, in the 21st century, a significant amount of goods and 
services rely on the use and/or provision of intangible intellectual 
property resources.  The abundance of technology in society has led to 
massive growth in the intellectual property industry, particularly 
patents.  Technology developers rely on patents, and to a certain 25 
extent trade marks and copyright, to protect both their brands and 
products. 
The result of a rapid change in the type of assets being dealt with, 
and the use of these assets, has resulted in a tax system that is poorly 
equipped to deal with a significant proportion of transactions. 1  30 
Corporations are therefore able to engage in tax strategies that comply 
with the strict letter of the law, but do not uphold the spirit or purpose 
of the law.2  This paper will examine the company structures and 
transactions used by technology-rich companies in order to exploit 
these out-dated laws and to avoid corporate income tax.  The paper 35 
will then focus on exploring whether there are any feasible solutions 
other than a complete reform of the income tax system. 
                                                        
1 James Fryer “The Price Isn’t Right: Corporate Profit Shifting has Become Big 
Business” (16 February 2013) <www.theeconomist.com>. 
2 John VanDenburgh “Closing International Loopholes: Changing the Corporate Tax 
Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance” (2012) 47 Val U L Rev 313 at 327. 
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Part II of the paper will outline the commonly used Double Irish 
and Dutch Sandwich strategies for tax avoidance in respect of 
intellectual property.  This will involve consideration of both the 
company structures employed and the effect of the relevant 
transactions occurring within those structures.  Included in this part 5 
will be a description of the laws that are being exploited to enable 
these structures to function.  Following this, examination of Apple 
Incorporated will provide a concrete example of the benefits obtained 
by the companies when using these structures. 
Part III of the paper then goes on to explain the specific features of 10 
intellectual property that allow the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
to function effectively. 
Part IV of the paper will build on the explanation of the features of 
intellectual property to show the problematic nature of these 
structures, from both an economic point of view and an intellectual 15 
property point of view.  Tax avoidance is a major issue facing 
governments around the world, as income tax is one of the 
government’s main sources of funds.  In the context of intellectual 
property, there is also a concern that there is no connection between 
the place where the economic activity resulting from the intellectual 20 
property occurs, and the place where the intellectual property is 
developed and created.  Therefore allowing these transactions and 
structures to be used is inconsistent with the traditional rationale for 
protection of intellectual property. 
The paper will then analyse several possible measures that could be 25 
taken to counteract the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures.  
The applicability of a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in the form 
of the New Zealand GAAR will be considered, in addition to 
consideration of the United States GAAR.  The final part of the paper 
will consider whether the separate entity doctrine is implicated in any 30 
attempt to resolve the problem. 
II Avoidance Strategies: The Double Irish and the 
Dutch Sandwich 
Intellectual property assets have the valuable feature of being 
intangible, enabling them to be licensed and transferred between 35 
companies and jurisdictions with relative ease.  Where companies 
have large numbers of intangible assets, namely intellectual property, 
strategies such as the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich are often used 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 7 
to avoid paying income tax.  This behaviour is increasingly prevalent 
amongst technology based firms such as Apple Inc., Google Inc., and 
Microsoft Corporation.  These strategies were pioneered by Apple, 
and are favoured because they enable facile offshore profit shifting.3 
Ireland is the favoured destination for these transactions due to a 5 
combination of several factors, including a low corporate tax rate, 
favourable tax treaties that limit the tax on transactions between 
subsidiaries, and a well-educated and English speaking workforce.4 
A Residency or Source Based Taxation 
There are two fundamental concepts in income tax that are often 10 
exploited by tax avoiders. 5   The first is the basis for income tax.  
Income tax systems are generally based either on source of income 
(territorial system), or on the residency of the taxpayer (worldwide 
system).  It is generally accepted that both the source country and the 
residence country have a valid claim to tax certain income. 6  In a 15 
system based on source of income, the taxpayer will be liable to pay 
tax on income earned within the jurisdiction of the taxing state.  By 
contrast, in a system based on residency, once a taxpayer is deemed to 
be a resident in the taxing state they will be liable to pay income tax 
on their worldwide income.7  Many states will use a combination of 20 
the territorial and worldwide systems.  This is true of both the United 
States and New Zealand.8 
                                                        
3 Steven Bank “The Globalisation of Corporate Tax Reform” (2013) 40 Pepperdine 
Law Review 1307 at 1310. 
4 John Sokatch “Transfer-Pricing with Sofware Allows for Effective Circumvention 
of Subpart F Income: Google’s ‘Sandwich’ Costs Taxpayers Millions” (2011) 45 
Int’l Law 725 at 732. 
5 This section is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the issues arising 
from taxing on the basis of source or residency.  It is merely intended to provide a 
background to the following discussion and explain why the relevant rules are able 
to be exploited. 
6  Michael J Graetz Foundations of International Income Taxation (Foundation 
Press, New York, 2003) at 5.  It is important to recognise that this creates the 
potential for double taxation.  A discussion of issues relating to double taxation is 
superfluous to this paper. 
7 VanDenburgh, above n 2, at 321 
8 In the United States a corporation will be taxed on worldwide income if it is 
resident in the United States.  A foreign company will also be taxed by the United 
States if its income is earned within the United States. Income earned by offshore 
subsidiaries will not be taxed unless it is repatriated to the United States.  New 
Zealand taxes income on both a residency and source basis.  When a corporation is 
resident in New Zealand, it will be taxed on worldwide income, that is, income 
derived from sources within and outside of New Zealand.  Income earned by a 
Controlled Foreign Corporation will be attributed to the New Zealand resident 
shareholder if the interest is greater than 10 per cent, and the Controlled Foreign 
Corporation is not an active business.  The offshore subsidiaries discussed in the 
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The second fundamental concept is the manner of determining 
residency.  For example, when determining whether a corporation is a 
resident for tax purposes, some states will use a test based on place of 
incorporation, while some states will determine residency based on 
where the management and control of the company is located.  For 5 
example, Ireland determine company residency using a test of 
management and control, while the United States determine company 
residency based on place of incorporation. 
Both of these concepts are central to the explanation of how the 
Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures exploit different tax 10 
systems.  The differences in residency rules are fundamental to the 
effective functioning of the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
structures, as the parent company exploits the difference in rules to 
create subsidiaries with no legal residency. 
B The Double Irish: Company Structure and Licensing 15 
Arrangements 
The Double Irish strategy involves taking advantage of a feature of 
Irish tax law that allows a company based overseas to be registered as 
an Irish company.9  The predominant feature of this arrangement is 
that the parent corporation wishing to avoid a corporate tax bill will 20 
set up a subsidiary in Ireland (B).  Subsidiary B will then set up a 
wholly owned subsidiary (S), also in Ireland.  The name of the 
structure comes from use of two Irish incorporated subsidiaries. 
The default position is now that a company incorporated in Ireland 
will be treated as resident in Ireland for tax purposes.10  However, the 25 
Finance Act 1999 introduced several exceptions to this rule, one of 
which enables subsidiary B to be deemed an overseas resident, despite 
being incorporated in Ireland. 
For the purpose of the Double Irish, the applicable exception is that 
an Irish company will not be treated as resident for tax purposes if it is 30 
a relevant company, and it carries on trade in Ireland. 11   For a 
company to be classified as a relevant company, it must be controlled 
by a European Union resident, or by a company residing in a country 
that has a double-taxation treaty with Ireland.12  Therefore, because 
                                                                                                                                  
following part of the paper are wholly owned by the parent company, and therefore 
fall within the definition of a Controlled Foreign Company in New Zealand. 
9 Peter Flanagan “How this Double Irish accountancy trick works” (27 May 2013) 
<www.independent.ie>. 
10 Finance Act 1999, s 23A(1)(a) (Ireland). 
11 Finance Act 1999, s 23A(3) (Ireland). 
12 Finance Act 1999, s 23A(3) (Ireland). 
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Ireland has a double-taxation agreement with the United States, 13 
subsidiary B can avoid being classed as an Irish resident for tax 
purposes.  Subsidiary B will be incorporated in Ireland, but for the 
purposes of Irish tax law, it will be deemed to be a resident of an 
overseas tax haven, for example Bermuda.14  5 
Subsidiary B also avoids having United States residency because 
the United States rules are based on the source of income rather than 
the country of incorporation.  That is, corporate income tax is imposed 
on all domestic corporations, and on some foreign corporations that 
have income or activities in the jurisdiction. 15   The definition of 10 
domestic corporation includes corporations that are created in the 
United States. 16   It is the difference between the United States 
residency rules and the Irish residency rules that enables the Double 
Irish and Dutch Sandwich to function.  By incorporating subsidiaries 
overseas, the parent company ensures that the income of these 15 
subsidiaries is outside the reach of the United States Internal Revenue 
Service. 
Subsidiary B will have its effective centre of management in a tax 
haven, and therefore will be treated as a resident of the tax haven for 
the purpose of Irish taxation.  The centre of management and control 20 
is determined by reference to the location where the strategic and 
policy aspects of the company are determined.17  As a consequence, if 
subsidiary B has its effective centre of management in Bermuda, it 
will not be subject to any corporate income tax, as there is no 
corporate income tax in Bermuda, and it is not deemed to be a resident 25 
of any other state. 
The second subsidiary (S) will be wholly owned by subsidiary B, 
and will be incorporated in Ireland. 18   For Irish tax purposes, 
subsidiary S will be classed as an Irish resident.  
                                                        
13 Convention Between the Government of Ireland and Government of the United 
States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Ireland-United 
States (signed 28 July 1997). 
14 Bank, above n 3 at 1311. 
15 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(a)(4). 
16 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(a)(4). 
17  John Hickson “Corporate Migrations to Ireland” (2010) 36 International Tax 
Journal 25 at 27. 
18  Joseph B Darby “Double Irish More than Doubles the Tax Saving: Hybrid 
Structure Reduces US, Irish and Worldwide Taxation” (2007) 11(9) Practical 
US/International Tax Strategies 2 at 13. 
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Figure 1: The Double Irish Company Structure and Licensing Arrangements 
 
Once the above company structure is set up, licensing 5 
arrangements involving intellectual property will enable profit 
shifting.  The parent company will license its intellectual property 
rights to subsidiary B.  In return, subsidiary B will pay low royalties to 
the parent company.  Subsidiary B will then grant a sublicense of the 
intellectual property rights to subsidiary S.  This sublicense enables 10 
subsidiary S to exploit the rights, meaning that all income from sales 
and use of the intellectual property outside of the parent company’s 
home state will go to subsidiary S. 19  Subsidiary S will then pay 
substantial royalties and licence fees to Subsidiary B for their use of 
the intellectual property.  This essentially funnels the majority of 15 
income to Subsidiary B, where it can sit tax free in an offshore tax 
haven.20   
C The Double Irish: Tax Benefits 
The overall arrangement provides significant tax benefits to the parent 
company.  The only income that the parent company receives is 20 
income from local sales and use of the intellectual property rights. 
This means that the pre-tax income of the parent company is 
significantly less than it would be if it was receiving the income from 
the worldwide sales and use of the intellectual property.  The 
transaction thereby lowers the incidence of income tax for the parent 25 
                                                        
19 Bank, above n 3, at 1311. 
20  Stephen C Loomis “The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax 
Havens” (2012) 43 St Mary’s Law Journal 825 at 839. 
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company.  Under a cost sharing agreement, some expenses of the 
subsidiaries will also be attributed to the parent company so that the 
company is able to make deductions that further reduce the tax bill of 
the parent company.21  
The main tax benefit of the transaction arises because subsidiary B 5 
is situated in a country that has little or no corporate income tax, for 
example Bermuda.  As a consequence, if the profits reside there, they 
will be tax-free until such time as the parent company wishes to use 
the money.  The money can often be repatriated to the United States 
without the usual income tax consequences by exploiting several 10 
loopholes in the Federal Tax Code. 22  Repatriation of funds by an 
offshore subsidiary incurs federal income tax under § 881 of the 
Federal Tax Code.23 
1 Circumvention of Subpart F 
Under the Federal Tax Code controlled foreign corporations not 15 
engaged in United States trade or business are not taxed by the United 
States on their profits.  Therefore, prior to the introduction of Subpart 
F, there was significant opportunity for a United States corporation to 
shift its operations to an offshore subsidiary.  Subpart F was 
introduced to mitigate this by introducing rules relating to personal 20 
holding companies, foreign personal holding companies, and 
controlled foreign corporations. 
In relation to the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich, the first 
relevant rule is the Foreign Base Company Sales Income rule.  Income 
earned by a foreign subsidiary will be taxable when the subsidiary 25 
does not materially participate in the generation of the income, and the 
subsidiary either buys or sells personal property from or to a related 
party. 24  Under this rule, the income of subsidiary B would ordinarily 
be taxable as neither subsidiary B or subsidiary S participates in the 
generation of income, and the subsidiary is buying personal property 30 
from a related party in the form of intellectual property rights. 
The second relevant rule in regard to the Double Irish and Dutch 
Sandwich structures is the Foreign Personal Holding Company 
Income rule.  The rule is designed to tax interest, dividends, royalties 
                                                        
21 Carl Levin and John McCain “Offshore Profit Shifting and the US Tax Code – 
Part 2 (Apple Inc)” (memorandum to the Members of the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, 21 May 2013) at 9. 
22 Loomis, above n 20 at 839. 
23 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 881. 
24 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC §§ 954(d). 
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and other passive income that is earned by a foreign subsidiary. 25  
Thus, it would appear that the substantial income of subsidiary B 
should also be caught by the Foreign Personal Holding Company 
Income rule as its income is in the form of royalties in return for a 
sublicense of intellectual property rights. 5 
The effectiveness of these Subpart F rules has been weakened by 
statutory changes.  In particular, the check-the-box-rules are often 
used to enable exploitation of Subpart F.26  The check the box rules 
allow a domestic or foreign business entity to elect whether it will be 
treated as a corporation or a pass-through entity27 for the purposes of 10 
the Federal Tax Code.  This rule creates what are known as hybrid 
entities.28  The company can elect to be taxed as an entity in one tax 
jurisdiction and taxed as a disregarded (or pass-through) entity in the 
other jurisdiction.  The parent company based in the United States can 
therefore elect that the other subsidiaries are to be treated as 15 
disregarded.  When check-the-box elections are made on multiple 
subsidiaries of a United States based parent company, the subsidiaries 
are treated as a single entity for United States tax purposes.  Therefore 
any transactions between the subsidiaries will not be taxable under 
United States law.29  In the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich this 20 
means that United States law will not tax payments from subsidiary S 
to subsidiary B.30   
The usual position is that the transactions between subsidiaries 
would fall within the scope of the Foreign Base Company Sales 
Income rule.  However, by making a check-the-box election the parent 25 
company avoids paying the Foreign Base Company Sales Income 
tax. 31   The check-the box election also enables avoidance of the 
Foreign Personal Holding Company Income tax, as the disregarded 
status of the entities means any dividends or royalties paid to 
Subsidiary B are also not taxable.32 30 
The above discussion illustrates that use of a European based 
subsidiary to funnel income into a tax haven is necessary to enable 
circumvention of the Foreign Base Company Sales Income and 
                                                        
25 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC §§ 954(c). 
26 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 5. 
27  A pass through entity arises where the income of the entity is treated as the 
income of the shareholder owners 
28 VanDenburgh, above n 2, at 330. 
29 J Richard Harvey “Testimony Before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations” (21 May, 2013) at 20. 
30 Darby, above n 18, at 13. 
31 Harvey, above n 29, at 20. 
32 Harvey, above n 29, at 20. 
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Foreign Personal Holding Company Income rules.  If the arrangement 
simply involved a licence transaction by the parent company to the 
subsidiary in a tax haven, the income would be taxed at the usual 
United States rate under the Controlled Foreign Company rules. 
The overall tax bill for subsidiary S is also lowered by this 5 
arrangement because royalties or fees paid by subsidiary S to 
subsidiary B are deductible expenses.33  As a consequence, despite 
having a very large income, the scale of the deductible expenses 
means subsidiary S will have a low taxable income.  When compared 
to the amount of profits being made, the effective tax rate on those 10 
profits is much lower than the corporate income tax rate in Ireland.34 
D The Dutch Sandwich 
The Dutch Sandwich structure is largely similar to the Double Irish. 
The key difference is that the Dutch Sandwich employs a third 
subsidiary, N.  This subsidiary will be situated in the Netherlands, and 15 
will typically be a shell company. 35   That is, it will have no 
employees, no physical presence in the country and will not produce 
any goods or services. 36   In the Double Irish structure described 
above, the income from sales and exploitation of the intellectual 
property is transferred to subsidiary B in the form of extensive royalty 20 
payments and dividends.  By contrast, in the Dutch Sandwich, the 
income is shifted to subsidiary N before being transferred to 
subsidiary B.37  
Under EC Directive 2003/49 interest and royalty payments made 
by a corporation in one European Union member state to a subsidiary 25 
in another European Union member state will not be taxed provided 
the beneficial owner of the payment is a company or a permanent 
establishment in another member state. 38  These transactions enable 
subsidiary S to avoid any Irish withholding tax payments that they 
would otherwise be liable to pay.39   30 
 
                                                        
33 Loomis, above n 20, at 839. 
34 The corporate income tax rate in Ireland is currently at 12.5%. 
35 Bank, above n 3, at 1311. 
36 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 10.   
37 Bank, above n 3, at 1311. 
38 Directive 2003/49 on the Taxation of Cross-Border Interest and Royalty Payments 
in the European Union, OJ L 157, P. 0049 – 0054, Article 1. 
39 Fryer, above n 1.  See also Sokatch, above n 4, at 741. 
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Figure 2: The Dutch Sandwich Company Structure and Licensing Arrangements 
 
E A Specific Example: Apple 
The example of Apple will be used to give a specific example of use 5 
of a structure similar to the Double Irish.  The scale of the avoidance 
undertaken by Apple is such that in 2013 the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee of Investigations began investigating Apple as part of 
its review of offshore profit shifting and the tax code.   
In 2013, Apple was one of the most profitable companies in the 10 
world, with over USD 145 billion in cash, cash equivalents and 
marketable securities.40  It was founded in the United States in 1976, 
and its primary marketing and research and development operations 
remain in the United States.  Apple also has significant offshore 
holdings, with its Irish operations having been in operation since 15 
1980.41  Despite being a United States based company, around USD 
102 billion of its total assets reside overseas, and are thus not subject 
to United States corporate income tax.42   
The company structure employed by Apple is complex, and results 
in a clear separation of United States sales and business from offshore 20 
sales and business.  Apple Inc. has a wholly owned subsidiary, Apple 
Operations International, which is incorporated in Ireland.  Apple 
Operations International is a holding company that is the primary 
owner of the majority of the other related entities.  Apple Singapore, 
                                                        
40 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 5. 
41 “Testimony of Apple Before The Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations” 
(US Senate, 21 May 2013) at 8. 
42 Levin and McCain, above n21, at 17. 
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Apple Operations Europe and Apple Distributions International are all 
wholly owned subsidiaries of Apple Operations International.43  Apple 
Distributions International and Apple Operations Europe are also 
incorporated in Ireland.  Apple Sales International is a wholly owned 
Irish subsidiary of Apple Operations Europe.  Unlike Apple 5 
Operations International, Apple Sales International is taxed in Ireland 
as it is treated as an Irish resident. 
Apple Operations International is a shell company, and despite 
being incorporated in Ireland it has no physical presence there and has 
never had any employees.  It has three directors, all of whom are 10 
employees of other Apple companies.  The assets of Apple Operations 
International are managed in the United States by another subsidiary, 
Braeburn Capital.44  The consequence of the management and control 
of the company being in the United States is that the company has no 
declared tax residency. 45   Apple Operations International are the 15 
primary recipient of the funds obtained from offshore sales and 
investments, and they consolidate and manage these funds in a way 
that enables the business to grow and develop without needing to 
repatriate the income to the United States.  This is a necessary step in 
the tax avoidance scheme because repatriation of the income to a 20 
United States resident corporation would incur a 35 per cent tax.46 
Prior to 2012, Apple Sales International was also a shell company 
with no employees.  In 2012, 250 employees were transferred to 
Apple Sales International from another of Apple’s Irish entities, thus 
making it appear as though Apple Sales International has a substantial 25 
business purpose.   
The overall flow of income is as follows.  A third party 
manufacturer in a country such as China is contracted by Apple Sales 
International to manufacture the products.  The finished products are 
then sold to Apple Sales International, who on-sell the products to 30 
Apple Distributions International or Apple Singapore for distribution 
around the world.  Apple Distributions International and Apple 
Singapore pay a high price for these products, as the profits they 
receive from product sales are significant.  Apple Sales International 
therefore has a substantial income, which is transferred to Apple 35 
Operations Europe in the form of dividends.  The dividends are then 
                                                        
43 Levin and McCain, above n21, at 20. 
44 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 22. 
45 For an explanation of the Irish Corporate Residency rules, refer to section B of 
this part of the paper. 
46 Sokatch, above n 4, at 726. 
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transferred to Apple Operations International in the form of further 
dividends.47 
Setting up subsidiaries in this way exploits a key difference in the 
Irish and United States tax bases.  For Irish purposes, Apple 
Operations International is not an Irish resident because Irish 5 
residency rules are based on a system of management and control.   
The company is disregarded for United States tax purposes as the 
United States tax residency rules are based on place of incorporation.  
United States law provides that a shell entity that is incorporated in a 
foreign jurisdiction can be disregarded if the extent of control by the 10 
parent company is such that the shell entity is a mere instrument of the 
parent.48   
Shifting the business in this manner enables offshore sales revenue 
to be generated in Ireland rather than in the United States.  In the 
1990s manufacturing was outsourced to third parties,49 meaning that 15 
Apple Sales International contracts to become the first purchaser of 
the goods from the manufacturers.  The goods are then sold to the 
relevant distribution subsidiary at a much higher price than they were 
purchased for.50   
Apple Sales International is the primary intellectual property rights 20 
recipient from Apple Inc.  Both licensing agreements and cost sharing 
agreements are used to shift intellectual property rights offshore.51  A 
cost sharing agreement is where two or more related entities share the 
cost of developing the intellectual property, and then share the 
resulting rights.  The subsidiary will typically make a buy-in payment 25 
to compensate the parent company for their loss for incurring initial 
costs and risks in development.52  
Offshore profit shifting is enabled by these agreements for two key 
reasons.  First, the proportion of profits that remains out of the United 
States is not an accurate reflection of the proportion of research and 30 
development that is done within the United States.53   Despite the 
                                                        
47 Levin and McCain, above n21, at 26. 
48 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 23. 
49 Levin and McCain, above n 21 at 19 
50 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 19. 
51 Levin and McCain, above n 21 at 7. 
52 Levin and McCain, above n 21 at 8. 
53  From 2009-2012, ASI made USD 74 billion in profits from the intellectual 
property covered by the cost sharing agreements, yet payments of only USD 5 
billion were made to Apple Inc in relation to the research and development.  See 
Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 28-29. 
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majority of the research being done in the United States,54 the bulk of 
the profits are stored offshore.  Secondly, the transfer of rights does 
not result in any change to the commercial operations of the company.  
They simply alter the tax liability in regard to the profits. 55   One 
would expect that if there were a commercial reason behind the 5 
transfers, there would also be comparable transfers to other regions 
where Apple conducts business.  The fact that there are not indicates 
that the tax benefits are the predominant purpose of the transactions.56 
III Intellectual Property 
The scope of this paper will be confined to a discussion of the use of 10 
the Dutch Sandwich and Double Irish tax structures to avoid paying 
tax on transactions involving intellectual property assets.  While it is 
feasible that the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich could also be 
applicable to physical, tangible goods, one of the reasons these 
structures are so effective is that the assets in question, namely the 15 
intellectual property, can be instantly transferred between 
jurisdictions, and it is easy to exploit their value.57   
For the purposes of this paper, intellectual property will be taken to 
mean copyright, patents and trade marks. 58  Patents are granted in 
respect of inventions,59 and are therefore at the heart of the structures 20 
used by technology-based companies such as Google and Apple.  The 
paper will largely focus on the use of patents because they are the 
most commonly used rights transferred in the Double Irish and Dutch 
Sandwich transactions.60 
                                                        
54 Information supplied to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee by Apple indicated 
that in 2011, 95% of research and development was conducted in the United States.  
See Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 28. 
55 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 28. 
56 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 29. 
57  W Wesley Hill and J Sims Rhyne “Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global 
Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and Their Implications for The United States” 
(2013) 53(3) IDEA – The Intellectual Property Law Review 371 at 373. 
58 Copyright protection lends itself to literary and artistic works, while trade marks 
protect both the goodwill and the symbols of a company that are needed to 
distinguish competing products and services.  
59 William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin Intellectual Property: Patents, 
Copyright, TradeMarks and Allied Rights (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) 
at 1-05.  
60 Howard Gleckman “The Real Story On Apple’s Tax Avoidance: How Ordinary It 
Is” (21 May 2013) <www.forbes.com>. 
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A Characteristics of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual property rights are typically conferred through statute,61 
and have two key features that help to explain why intellectual 
property is the favoured subject matter for the tax avoidance strategies 
at issue in this paper.  First, intellectual property rights are 5 
traditionally exclusive rights rather than absolute rights.62  The rights 
given are therefore the right to exclude another from using your 
property, rather than a positive right to use the property.  Secondly, 
intellectual property is intangible.  Despite being intangible, it will 
typically be treated in the same manner as all other property.63  Thus, 10 
when you have an intellectual property right you can keep the rights, 
assign them to someone else, grant exclusive or non-exclusive 
licences to use the property, and you can abandon your rights.64 
The ability to licence intellectual property is at the heart of the tax 
avoidance issue.  Provisions allowing the licensing of intellectual 15 
property rights are put in place to cater for the common circumstance 
where the licensee is in a better position to exploit the rights provided 
than the rights holder. 65   Thus, the overseas transfer of rights is 
facilitated in order to promote cheaper manufacturing of goods.  The 
strong protection of intellectual property rights in the United States 20 
means that many licences will only cover the economic part of the 
bundle of rights.66  By licensing only some of the rights, the United 
States based rights holder is able to retain the strong rights protections 
granted in the United States, while shifting economic rights and 
profits offshore to avoid United States corporate income tax. 25 
Additionally, intellectual property assets are also unique.  Tangible 
assets are typically similar to other tangible assets, and thus are 
relatively easy to value.  Conversely, intangible assets are often 
different to other assets and are therefore difficult to value accurately 
                                                        
61 In New Zealand, the Copyright Act 1994, the Patents Act 1953, and the Trade 
Marks Act 2002.  Note that in 2014 the Patents Act 2013 will come into force 
replacing the Patents Act 1953. 
62 Philip W Grubb and Peter R Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, 
and Biotechnology: Fundamentals of Global Law, Practise and Strategy (5th ed, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) at 4. 
63 Grubb and Thomsen, above n 62, at  6. 
64  Grubb and Thomsen, above n 62, at 6.  This collection of property rights is 
collectively referred to as the bundle of rights.  That is, that property rights in both 
tangible and intangible things are rights in relation to others, rather than rights to the 
thing.  The bundle of rights enables divisibility of ownership and separation of 
different rights.  Thus, it is possible to license part of the rights associated with a 
patent, and retain the other rights. See Denise R Johnson “Reflections on the Bundle 
of Rights” (2007) 32 Vt L Rev 247 at 247. 
65 Cornish, Llewelyn and Aplin, above n 59, at 7-22. 
66 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 25. 
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because a comparison cannot be made.  In regard to patents, this 
uniqueness arises because the property right must be in relation to an 
invention that is both novel and involves an inventive step.67 
From the above it can be seen that the intangible nature of 
intellectual property gives it two key advantages for involvement in 5 
tax avoidance schemes.  First, its intangible nature means the rights 
can be shifted almost instantly, and secondly its uniqueness and the 
corresponding difficulties in valuation make it significantly easier to 
exploit pricing arrangements. 
IV Are These Transactions Problematic? 10 
Use of the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures gives two key 
results for the companies and States involved.  First, they enable 
companies such as Google and Apple to avoid the relatively high 
corporate income tax rate in the United States.  This results in these 
corporations paying income tax at rates that amount to as little as 15 
2.4% of their profits.68  The second result of shifting significant profits 
overseas is that there is little connection between where the economic 
activity takes place and where the profits are booked.69  These results 
lead to two problems for states.  There is a negative effect on the 
economy as a result of shifting profits to jurisdictions where they are 20 
tax free, and there is a concern that allowing the shifts of intellectual 
property is inconsistent with the rationale for providing intellectual 
property protection in the first place. 
A Economic Effects 
The economic activity can be separated into two categories.  They are 25 
the development of the intellectual property such as trade marks and 
patents, and the product sales.  The intellectual property involved in 
these transactions will typically be developed in the United States, 
resulting in economic activity there from job creation and resource 
use. The intellectual property will also be protected in the United 30 
States through patent or trade mark applications and grants.  By 
contrast, the product sales and their resulting economic activity will 
take place in Ireland. 
As a result of employing the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
structures Google were able to avoid tax of up to USD 2 billion in the 35 
                                                        
67 Patents Act 1953, s 21(1). 
68 Loomis, above n 20, at 828. 
69 Fryer, above n 34. 
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United States by shifting billions of dollars of profits to overseas tax 
havens. 70  This is clearly a significant blow to the government’s 
reliance on tax collection.71  The economic effect of tax avoidance is 
further emphasised by the fact that “corporate tax receipts as a share 
of profits are at their lowest level in at least 40 years”.72  The United 5 
States has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and corporate 
profits now form a record high percentage of GDP.  Despite this 
domination of the economy by corporations, corporate tax now forms 
a record low percentage of federal taxes.73 This is taking place against 10 
a background of record levels of federal debt, which has in 2013 
reached around USD 16 trillion.74 
The extent of the problem becomes clearer when the link between 
intellectual property and growth of the national economy is examined.  
It is clear that there is a causal link between intellectual property and 15 
economic growth, and that intellectual property resources are now 
necessary in order to be competitive on an international scale.75  The 
importance of intellectual property to economic growth reflects the 
sheer scale of intellectual property use, thus indicating that the role of 
tax derived from intellectual property should also be quite significant.   20 
The structures also provide multinational corporations with an 
advantage over United States based domestic corporations.76  While 
many corporations are now multinational, the smaller national 
companies are at a disadvantage because they do not have the 
resources to engineer tax avoidance structures.  Thus, the companies 25 
that are already the most profitable are the ones who are able to 
exploit loopholes in the tax law in order to make them even more 
profitable. 
                                                        
70 Fryer, above n 1. 
71 It is a generally accepted premise that the Government relies on income tax to 
function effectively. See VanDenburgh, above n 2, at 315. 
72  Damian Paletta “With Tax Break, Corporate Rate is Lowest in Decades” (3 
February 2012) Wall Street Journal <online.wsj.com>. 
73 Fryer, above n 1.  There is evidence that the share of corporate tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP is consistently decreasing across the OECD.  See Simon Loretz 
“Corporate Taxation in the OECD in a Wider Context” (2008) 24 Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 639 at 642, Figure 1. 
74 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 3 
75 Donald S Chisum and others Principles of Patent Law: Cases and Materials (2nd 
ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2001) at 59. 
76 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 10. 
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B Consistency with the Rationale for Protecting Intellectual 
Property 
The key justification for protection of intellectual property, in 
particular patents, is the incentive to invent theory.  Under this theory, 
patents are granted to encourage invention.  Without being certain that 5 
there is some kind of protection for their work and thus an ability to 
make money from it, people are less likely to engage in the inventive 
process.77  In this respect, patent protection is a bargain between the 
inventor and the public. That is, the law provides protection for 
inventions and exclusive rights that enable profits to be derived from 10 
the invention, in return for a public disclosure of the invention and its 
contents by the inventor. 78  This provides a benefit to society from 
access to the invention, albeit at a cost, while also providing a benefit 
to the inventor in the form of remuneration. 
When intellectual property is licensed overseas and the related 15 
profits are derived overseas, there is a lack of connection between the 
state providing the incentive and protection and the state where the 
profits reside.  Protection of intellectual property by the state generally 
confers an economic benefit back to the state both in terms of creation 
of economic activity and in terms of the ability to tax profits.  When 20 
the profits are being made and half the economic activity is taking 
place overseas, the benefit that the state ought to receive in return for 
protecting the intellectual property and providing the incentive to do 
the work does not occur on the level that it should.  
To a certain extent, profit shifting and overseas licensing can also 25 
be seen as an abuse of the privilege provided by intellectual property 
rights.  Protection of intellectual property provides the rights holder 
with a limited form of monopoly, in that they have control over the 
market for their particular goods or services.79  This is an exception to 
the general rule against monopolies.  The privilege of being provided 30 
with rights is being abused in order to obtain tax benefits. 
V Could the New Zealand GAAR Catch These Types of 
Strategies? 
Considering that the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures have 
such serious consequences, the remaining sections of the paper will be 35 
given over to consideration of possible methods to counteract them.  
                                                        
77 Chisum and others, above n 75, at 59. 
78 Chisum and others, above n 75, at 3. 
79 Grubb and Thomsen, above n 62, at 7. 
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This part of the paper will consider whether a GAAR in the form of the 
New Zealand rule could be used to counteract the Double Irish and 
Dutch Sandwich transactions.  The parent company and the 
subsidiaries will be considered separately. 
A Income Tax Act 2007 5 
The New Zealand GAAR is formed by a combination of several 
legislative provisions, namely ss YA 1, BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income 
Tax Act 2007.  The overarching rule is that “a tax avoidance 
arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income tax 
purposes.”80   Tax avoidance is then further defined in s YA 1 as 10 
including: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any 
income tax: 
(b) directly or indirectly relieving a person from liability to 15 
pay income tax or from a potential or prospective liability 
to future income tax: 
(c) directly or indirectly avoiding, postponing, or reducing 
any liability to income tax or any potential or prospective 
liability to future income tax 20 
 
A transaction is considered to be an avoidance arrangement if it has 
“tax avoidance as one of its purposes or effects”, making it clear that 
tax avoidance does not have to be the sole reason for undertaking the 
arrangement.81  The final provision comprising the GAAR is s GA 1, 25 
which defines the Commissioner’s powers to act when an arrangement 
is found to be an avoidance arrangement. 
Importantly, the definition of avoidance is not exhaustive, so 
schemes that do not fit directly into this definition can also be caught if 
the courts deem them to be avoidance arrangements. 30 
B Judicial Interpretation and Application of the GAAR 
The broad wording of the GAAR means that it has a conceivably wide 
scope that must be confined by the courts. When taken literally, the 
GAAR would apply to the majority of business and family 
transactions.82  As a result of the potential scope of the provision, a 35 
purposive interpretation will be preferred to the literal reading of the 
                                                        
80 Income Tax Act 2007, s BG 1(1). 
81 Income Tax Act 2007, s YA 1. 
82 See for example Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 683 
per Woodhouse J. 
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provisions.83  A purposive interpretation is consistent with s 5(1) of the 
Interpretation Act 1999, which instructs the courts to determine the 
meaning of an enactment in the light of both the text and its purpose.84 
Before applying the GAAR, it will be necessary to consider whether 
the transactions are actually covered by the specific provision at issue.  5 
If the transactions are not in accordance with the letter of the law, there 
will be no need to contemplate whether the GAAR could be used to 
remedy the situation.85  In situations where the relevant arrangement or 
structure is in accordance with the strict letter of the law, consideration 
will move to whether the “taxpayer has use[d] specific provisions of 10 
the Act and otherwise legitimate structures in a manner which cannot 
have been within the contemplation of Parliament.”86  This is known as 
the parliamentary contemplation test. 
The leading case describing application of the GAAR is the Supreme 
Court ruling in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Others v 15 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Ben Nevis). 87   In that case, the 
Supreme Court endorsed the three-step test for application of the 
GAAR.88  The preliminary step before the GAAR can be considered is to 
determine whether the transactions at issue comply with the strict letter 
of the law, as the GAAR can only apply when the transactions are 20 
beyond the scope of what Parliament intended the law to be used for.89  
If the transactions are determined to fall within the letter of the law, the 
three-stage application of the GAAR can proceed. 
The first step is for the court to determine whether there was an 
arrangement.90  An arrangement is defined in s YA 1 to mean “any 25 
contract, agreement, plan or understanding”.  It is clear that the 
concept of arrangement covers both the initial setting up of the 
transactions and their working on a regular basis.91 
                                                        
83 See for example BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 
19 NZTC 15,732 (HC) at [46]; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [1974] 2 
NZLR 279 at 280 (CA); Challenge Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(1986) 2 NZLR 513 at 534 (CA). 
84 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
85 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Ors v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] 
NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289 at [106]. 
86 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95 at [47]. 
87 Ben Nevis, above n 85. 
88 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [160]. 
89 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [106]. 
90 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [160]. 
91 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 86, at [34].. 
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The second step is for the court to determine the purpose of the 
arrangement.92  This involves the application of the definition in s YA 
1.  A tax avoidance arrangement is defined as:93 
 
… an arrangement, whether entered into by the person 5 
affected by the arrangement or by another person, that 
directly or indirectly – 
(a) has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect; or 
(b) has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes or effects, 
whether or not any other purpose or effect is referable to 10 
ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance 
purpose or effect is not merely incidental  
 
The arrangement is assessed objectively, without specifically looking 
at the motives of those who enter into the arrangement. 94   If the 15 
transaction is not motivated by a legitimate, non-tax purpose, the 
Commissioner is able to assert it is part of a tax avoidance 
arrangement.95   
Application of the parliamentary contemplation test will occur at 
this second stage.  As the majority in Ben Nevis stated, the function of 20 
the GAAR is to “prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall 
outside their intended scope in the overall scheme of the Act.” 96  
Therefore, the key question is whether the arrangement, when viewed 
in a commercially and economically realistic way, is using the relevant 
provision in a way that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.97 25 
The final step will be to determine whether the Commissioner will 
use his powers of reconstruction in s GA 1 to adjust the arrangement.98  
When an arrangement is held to be void as against the Commissioner 
under s BG 1, the Commissioner has the power to adjust the taxable 
income of a person involved in the arrangement in order to counteract 30 
the tax advantage gained by use of the arrangement.99   
There is no definition for the phrase tax advantage in the legislation, 
meaning that the case law will influence the Commissioner’s decision. 
                                                        
92 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [162]. 
93 Income Tax Act 2007, s YA 1.  Emphasis added. 
94 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [102]. 
95 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 86, at [49].  See also Ben 
Nevis, above n 85, at [109]. 
96 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [106]. 
97 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [109].  The Supreme Court in Penny again emphasised 
the importance of the commercial reality and the motivation behind the transaction.  
See Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 86, at [49]. 
98 Income Tax Act 2007, s GB 1. 
99 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [169]. 
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The decision in Ben Nevis appears to suggest that there must be a link 
between the tax advantage and the obtaining of a tax benefit beyond 
those contemplated by Parliament.100  For the purposes of s BG 1, the 
tax advantage will not encompass all tax advantages, but will be 
limited to the tax advantages that would have been obtained if the 5 
GAAR were not applied.  In Miller (No. 1) v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (Miller), Baragwanath J noted that tax advantage “must 
include the benefit of tax avoidance which (but for [the GAAR]) the 
Commissioner was entitled to conclude the plaintiffs have 
achieved”.101  In concurrence with the High Court, Blanchard J for the 10 
Court of Appeal noted that “the Commissioner is not inhibited from 
looking at the matter broadly and making an assessment on the basis of 
the benefit directly or indirectly received by the taxpayer”.102 
The Commissioner’s powers of adjustment are broad and 
discretionary. If the taxpayer disagrees with the adjustment made, the 15 
onus will be on the taxpayer to establish that it was wrong, and by how 
much.103  If the taxpayer cannot demonstrate clearly what the correct 
reconstruction ought to be, the Commissioner’s view will prevail.104  
The taxpayer can establish what they think the correct reconstruction 
ought to be by submitting an alternative reconstruction or 20 
adjustment.105 When making the adjustment, the Commissioner does 
not have to create an alternative scheme or attempt to determine what 
other steps may have been available to the taxpayer.106  Rather, the 
Commissioner must simply ensure that the taxpayer does not gain a tax 
advantage from the arrangement.107 25 
The provision of a broad discretion to the Commissioner means that 
the courts will typically be reluctant to intervene and alter the 
reconstruction made by the Commissioner. 108   The discretion must 
simply be exercised in good faith and free from irrelevant 
considerations. 30 
                                                        
100 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [169]-[171]. 
101 Miller (No. 1) v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 13.001 at 
13,035 (HC). Note that the decision of Baragwanath J was upheld in the Pricy 
Council, see Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 3 NZLR 316 (PC).  
102 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 1 NZLR 275 at 279 (CA).  
103 New Zealand Master Tax Guide 2012 at 33-125.  
104 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [171]. 
105 Ben Nevis, above n 85 at [171]. 
106 Case W33 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,321 at [48]. 
107 Case W33, above n 106, at [48]. 
108 Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (No 2) (2002) 20 NZTC 17,761 at 
[70] (HC). 
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C Hypothetical Application of the GAAR to the Parent Company 
The GAAR could not be used to counteract the structures as a whole, as 
multiple cross-border transactions are involved in the arrangement, and 
domestic law could not hope to reach all relevant countries.  It is also 
clear that avoidance of foreign tax will not be sufficient to activate the 5 
GAAR, as tax in this context is taken to mean New Zealand tax.109 In 
the light of these difficulties, the paper will consider first whether the 
parent company’ statement of income would be vulnerable to a GAAR 
in the New Zealand form.  Application of the GAAR to the subsidiaries 
will be considered separately. 10 
1 Compliance with the Specific Provisions at Issue 
Taking the Dutch Sandwich structure described in part II; the parent 
company receives income from local sales and use of the intellectual 
property, and also from the low royalty payments received from 
licensing the intellectual property to the subsidiary.110  This is the only 15 
transaction that the parent company is involved in.  The licence 
payments were typically structured to be as low as possible in order to 
reduce the income tax payable by the parent company.  The payments 
in question fall within the following definition of a transfer pricing 
agreement set out in s GC 6:111   20 
 
 (2) An arrangement is a transfer pricing arrangement if –  
(a) the arrangement involves the supply and acquisition of 
goods, services, money, other intangible property, or 
anything else; and 25 
(b) the supplier and acquirer are associated persons; and 
(c) the arrangement is a cross-border arrangement under 
subsection (3). 
 
The consequence of being deemed to be transfer pricing arrangements 30 
is that the payments must be made in accordance with the arm’s length 
principle.  That is, the arrangement must be made as if the buyer and 
the seller were unrelated economic entities.112  
In s GB 2 there is a specific-anti avoidance provision governing the 
misuse of transfer pricing.  This section would be applicable where the 35 
pricing was not found to reflect the arm’s length principle.  In the 
                                                        
109 Inland Revenue Interpretation Statement: Tax Avoidance and the Interpretation 
of sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 (13 June 2013) at [544]. 
110 Royalties are generally to be treated as income, for example in New Zealand 
under s CC 9 of the Income Tax Act 2007. 
111 Income Tax Act 2007, s GC 6(2). 
112 Income Tax Act 2007, s GC 8. 
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alternative, if the specific rule could not apply, or did not apply in a 
satisfactory manner, it is possible the GAAR could be used.113   For 
application of the GAAR to occur, the specific transfer pricing 
provisions in s GC 6 must be satisfied. 114 This may occur even in 
artificial transfer pricing arrangements because the nature of 5 
intellectual property is such that it is difficult to place an accurate 
value on it.115  Thus, the potential for the rules to be exploited is much 
higher than with other goods.   
The difficulties with applying the arm’s length rule to these types of 
transactions arise because it is easy to exploit the value of the assets.  10 
The onus is on the taxpayer to determine the arm’s length amount,116 
meaning the party determining the arm’s length price is the party that 
has the most intricate knowledge of the true value of the assets.  This 
makes it easier for the taxpayer to make an argument that the arm’s 
length principle has been satisfied because they can easily misrepresent 15 
the true value of the assets.  Any arguments made here would clearly 
be very fact specific, and would ultimately be difficult to determine. 
If the Commissioner were to bring a case against a taxpayer in 
respect of a transfer pricing agreement, they could make two possible 
arguments.  First, the Commissioner can argue that the strict wording 20 
of the provisions in regard to transfer pricing have not been complied 
with, in which case the Inland Revenue Department can challenge the 
taxpayer’s statement of their income.  
Application of the arm’s length principle to the licence agreement 
between the parent company and subsidiary B would result in a slight 25 
increase in the income of the parent company.  After application of the 
arm’s length principle, significant profits will still remain offshore and 
beyond the reach of the tax authorities. 
Alternatively, if it could be shown that the wording of the arm’s 
length provision was complied with, the Commissioner can bring a 30 
case under the GAAR. 
2 Step 1: Was there an Arrangement? 
The first step in the application of the GAAR will be to determine 
whether there was an arrangement.117  There are two possible options 
                                                        
113  See for example Challenge Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
[1986] 2 NZLR 513 at 559 (PC). 
114 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [109]. 
115 See the above discussion in Part III in relation to the characteristics of intellectual 
property. 
116 Income Tax Act 2007, s GC 13(4). 
117 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [160]. 
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when defining the arrangement.  It can be defined broadly as including 
the entire Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich schemes, or it can be 
defined narrowly as the initial licensing transaction from the parent 
company to subsidiary B.  When defined as meaning the scheme as a 
whole, the arguments following are stronger, as it is the entirety of the 5 
scheme that enables the tax avoidance to take place.  For the purposes 
of applying the GAAR to the parent company, the arrangement in 
question will be the entirety of the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
structures.  That is, it will include the plan to license the intellectual 
property to specifically set up subsidiaries, and the royalty payments 10 
and transfers.  It is thus clear that there is an arrangement within the 
definition of s YA 1. 
3 Step 2: Is the Purpose of the Arrangement within 
Parliamentary Contemplation?  
In the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures, setting royalty fees 15 
artificially low and setting up shell companies has no benefit to the 
parent company aside from reducing its income tax bill.  This indicates 
that the definition of tax avoidance in s YA 1 is likely to be satisfied.  
The second step is to determine the purpose of the arrangement,118 
and whether it sits outside the scope of the specific rule, as intended by 20 
Parliament.119  That is, was the principle used in a manner that was 
within parliamentary contemplation.  This will involve consideration 
of the commercial and economic reality of the situation, as well as of 
features of the whole arrangement. 120   
The purpose behind enactment of transfer pricing rules was to 25 
ensure that the proper amount of income derived by a multinational is 
attributed to its New Zealand operations. 121  When independent 
enterprises deal with each other, their dealings are generally 
determined by external market forces.  By contrast, dealings between 
related entities can be driven by other factors such as internal 30 
profitability and the allocation of those profits. 122   Regulation of 
dealings between related entities was introduced to ensure that transfer 
                                                        
118 Note that Supreme Court in Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue emphasised that it is the purpose of the arrangement that is to be 
determined, not the purpose of the parties.  The purpose or effect of the arrangement 
is to be determined objectively.  See Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 116, [2009] 2 NZLR 359 at [38].  Also emphasised in 
Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [102]. 
119 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [162].  
120 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [109]. 
121 Inland Revenue Tax Information Bulletin (Vol 12, No 10, October 2000). 
122 Inland Revenue Tax Information Bulletin, above  n 121 at [41]. 
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pricing arrangements were not used to shift goods and services 
between states in order to obtain maximum tax benefits for both 
entities.  It is highly unlikely that using entities specifically designed to 
engineer tax avoidance is within parliament’s contemplation of what 
constitutes an allowed transfer pricing agreement. 5 
The Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich arrangements are set up to 
facilitate tax avoidance in cross-border transactions between related 
entities.  The commercial and economic reality is that the arrangement 
appears to have no substantial business purpose other than tax 
avoidance, and the schemes appear to be artificial and contrived.  10 
However, any analysis of the parliamentary contemplation test is 
highly fact specific.123  In the case of Apple, the clear separation of its 
United States based income and its offshore income might provide a 
foundation for an argument that there was a substantial business 
purpose in the arrangement.  If Apple had shifted all of its income 15 
offshore the arrangement would appear to be more contrived in 
comparison to just shifting the overseas income.  
This step of the analysis indicates that application of the GAAR to 
the parent company will hold up better where the arrangement was 
broadly defined.  The argument that there was a tax avoidance 20 
arrangement is stronger when you can show a series of transactions 
that give multiple overall benefits, rather than a single exploitation of 
the transfer pricing rules that might be difficult to categorise as tax 
avoidance.  It is possible to argue that the single licensing agreement is 
an exploitation of the transfer pricing rules and beyond parliament’s 25 
contemplation of the use of those rules, but the argument that this also 
equates to tax avoidance is more difficult.   
A further argument that could be made in relation to the purpose of 
the arrangement concerns the extent of the tax avoidance undertaken.  
Eichelbaum CJ in Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue noted 30 
that on the particular facts of the case, “[t]he potential tax benefits 
were too significant and obvious.”124  This statement formed part of an 
analysis that concluded “that it would require a considerable degree of 
naivety to conclude that [the tax benefits] played merely an incidental 
part in the scheme.”  The indication that can be drawn from this is that 35 
                                                        
123 This is illustrated by the detailed ruling in Alesco where the relevant provisions 
and transactions were considered in great depth.  See Alesco New Zealand Ltd v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40. 
124 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1989] 2 NZLR 447 (HC) at 470.  
Note that the High Court decision of Eichelbaum CJ was upheld in the Court of 
Appeal: Hadlee v Commissoner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 (CA). 
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in some situations, the extent of the tax avoidance may be an indicator 
of a tax avoidance purpose.  This argument is strengthened by Harrison 
J’s recognition in Westpac Banking Corporation v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (Westpac) that:125 
 5 
The disparity between the underlying economics of the 
transaction and the resulting taxation treatment confirms that 
the anticipated tax effect was the true purpose of the 
transaction. 
 10 
In the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich, there is a clear disparity 
between the underlying economics of the transaction and the resulting 
tax treatment.  The tax benefits are also significant, indicated by 
reports that Google saves up to USD 2 billion each financial year.126  
An argument such as this might strengthen the Commissioner’s case 15 
that the tax avoidance purpose was more than merely incidental. 
There are several difficulties evident in arguing that the GAAR could 
be applied to negate the tax benefits received by the parent company.  
Analysis of these difficulties reveals a fundamental problem facing 
revenue authorities.  The multitude of rules involved and the cross-20 
border nature of the transactions means it is often possible to get a 
remedy in relation to a single transaction, but that it will be difficult to 
break down the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich schemes as a whole. 
4 Step 3: Application of the Commissioner’s Powers of 
Reconstruction 25 
The final step in application of the GAAR to the parent company is the 
determination of the Commissioner’s powers of reconstruction.  The 
Commissioner has the power to adjust the taxable income of a person 
affected by the arrangement in order to counteract the tax advantage 
obtained from the arrangement. 127  Here, the Commissioner has an 30 
extremely broad discretion as they may make any adjustments they 
think appropriate.128   
Application of the Commissioner’s powers of reconstruction to the 
subsidiaries is not limited to the specific transaction that the parent 
company is involved in.  As was stated by Harrison J in Westpac, “the 35 
Commissioner is not bound to isolate out and counteract only 
                                                        
125 Westpac Banking Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue CIV 2005-
404-2843 at [597]. 
126 Sokatch, above n 4, at 726. 
127 Income Tax Act 2007, s GA 1(2). 
128 Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 123, at 
[119]. 
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particular elements giving rise to a tax advantage”, meaning that the 
Commissioner can view the scheme as a whole. 129   Similar to the 
benefits obtained in Westpac, the tax benefits of the Double Irish and 
Dutch Sandwich would not be gained through use of the individual 
transactions.  Rather, it was the scheme as a whole that provided the 5 
tax benefit.130 
The practical difficulty with the application of the Commissioner’s 
power is that the profits are sitting offshore and are difficult for the 
Commissioner to assess.  The initial power to make a reconstruction 
belongs to the Commissioner.  However, if the taxpayer disagrees with 10 
the Commissioner’s assessment, the taxpayer has the onus of 
establishing that it is wrong, and by how much.131 Given the difficulty 
of determining the value of the assets in question, it is unlikely to be 
easy for the taxpayer to establish that the Commissioner was wrong.   
D Hypothetical Application of the GAAR to the Subsidiaries 15 
This section will consider whether a tax return made by any of the two 
or three subsidiaries would be upheld in the presence of a GAAR in the 
form of the New Zealand rule.  For the purposes of this section it will 
be assumed that all income tax legislative requirements are strictly 
complied with.  As with the application of the GAAR to the Parent 20 
company, the first step is easily satisfied and there is an arrangement.  
The arrangement is again defined widely to mean the scheme as a 
whole, including the setting up and use of shell companies, the overall 
effect of profit shifting and exploitation of transfer pricing agreements. 
In the Double Irish structure described above, the use of the second 25 
subsidiary has no economic purpose other than to avoid paying taxes.  
The consequence is that utilisation of tax havens and shell companies 
will make it difficult for companies to establish that tax avoidance was 
not one of the purposes or effects of the arrangement.  Even if the 
taxpayer can establish that they had a substantial business purpose for 30 
the arrangement, it is unlikely that a court would rule that the tax 
benefit was merely incidental. 
In the case of the subsidiaries, it is difficult to see how an argument 
could succeed that the arrangement has a substantial business purpose.  
The transactions between the Irish subsidiaries have no purpose other 35 
                                                        
129 Westpac Banking Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue¸ above n 125, 
at [641]. 
130  See for example, Westpac Banking Corporation v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue, above n 125, at [641]. 
131 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [171]. 
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than avoiding tax.  It is clear that a single company could conduct the 
business conducted by the Irish subsidiaries.  The second company is 
simply acting as a vehicle that enables the funds to be transferred in a 
manner that is not caught by United States law.  For this reason, it is 
arguably clearer that the subsidiary companies are engaged in a tax 5 
avoidance arrangement than the parent company.  The separation by 
the parent company of its local sales and overseas sales gives a 
plausible explanation for the shifting of business to an offshore 
subsidiary.  No such reason exists to explain the payments that occur 
between the Irish subsidiaries. 10 
It is clear that in the case of companies such as Google and Apple 
there is an existing company structure that handles any income and 
financial issues.  These structures are in place to deal with all local 
sales, as in the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures it is only 
the overseas sales that are handled by the subsidiaries.  It is difficult to 15 
argue that tax avoidance was not a purpose or effect if there is an 
existing mechanism for handling profits and payments of income tax 
that could be used for overseas sales in addition to any local sales.  
The final consideration when applying the GAAR is the powers of 
the Commissioner to counteract the arrangement.  This is the most 20 
difficult part of the analysis, as the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
would be likely to fall within the scope of the GAAR, but it is not clear 
whether the Commissioner would have the ability to do anything about 
them in a practical sense. 
In order to apply the GAAR to the subsidiaries, the Commissioner 25 
would have to argue that the assessable income is the income from all 
overseas sales, and that this should be attributed to subsidiary S.  
Assuming that subsidiary B remains a resident of an overseas tax 
haven, it is the income of subsidiary S that would be in question.  In 
order to accurately use their powers of reconstruction, the 30 
Commissioner would need to determine the income from sales and use 
of intellectual property by subsidiary S, and use this as the figure for 
determining the income tax bill.  This is more straightforward than the 
determination of the parent company’s income as the company in 
question is receiving income in the jurisdiction, so the Commissioner 35 
would simply need to look at income before the deductions were 
claimed.  This is permissible because the deductions claimed were not 
within parliamentary contemplation owing to their role in the tax 
avoidance arrangement. 
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VI Why has the United States GAAR Not Been Applied? 
This paper concludes that a GAAR in the form of the New Zealand rule 
would possibly find the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich 
arrangements to be tax avoidance, and therefore void for tax purposes.  
There would however, be practical difficulties in using the 5 
Commissioner’s powers of reconstruction.  In the light of this 
conclusion, this next part of the paper will consider whether the United 
States GAAR could be used to counteract the actions of the United 
States based parent companies. 
A The United States Judicially Developed Anti-Avoidance Rule 10 
Prior to 2010 the United States had a judicially developed anti-
avoidance rule.  First established in Gregory v Helvering, the rule was 
known as the economic substance doctrine.132  Given that the common 
law position on the economic substance doctrine has been incorporated 
directly into § 7701(o), this part of this paper will first outline the 15 
economic substance doctrine before describing how it is applied within 
the new statutory rule.   
The economic substance doctrine seeks to prevent tax avoidance 
and evasion by finding that certain transactions have no real effect.133  
The doctrine is an example of the courts taking a substance over form 20 
approach to the enforcement of tax law.134  In Gregory v Helvering the 
Supreme Court first set out the substance over form test in finding that 
corporate structures and reorganisations could not be used to hide the 
true character of the arrangement.135  The corollary of this is that the 
court was of the view that business decisions should not be made for 25 
the sole purpose of avoiding tax.136 While the court recognised that 
taxpayers have the right to minimise their taxes, the taxpayer did not 
win the case because the transactions in question were beyond the 
intention of the statute.137  The substance over form approach was also 
made explicit in Commissioner v Court Holding Co, where the court 30 
stated that “[t]he incidence of taxation depends on the substance of a 
transaction.”138 
                                                        
132 Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465, at 469 (1935). 
133  Erik M Jansen “Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Tax Avoidance: 
Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives” (2012) 57 St Louis U LJ 1, at 29. 
134  Philip Sancilio “Clarifying (or is it Codifying) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step 
Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code” (2013) 113 Columbia Law 
Review 138 at 139. 
135 Gregory v Helvering, above n 132, at 469. 
136 Gregory v Helvering, above n 132, at 469. 
137 Gregory v Helvering, above n 132, at 470. 
138 Commissioner v Court Holding Co 324 US 331 (1945) at 334. 
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The overall rule is said to be that “[i]f a transaction is devoid of 
economic substance … it simply is not recognized for federal taxation 
purposes.” 139   The economic substance rule is a straightforward 
application of the substance over form approach in that it involves 
looking behind the form of the transaction at the economic substance 5 
and effect of the transactions in question. 
Despite the rule developing for close to eighty years, there is no 
uniform definition of what economic substance means.140  One line of 
cases suggested that there is a two pronged test asking first if the 
transaction was motivated by a tax benefit purpose and second if there 10 
is no expectation of profits.141  If either of these elements is present the 
transaction will be found to have no economic substance.  The 
alternative approach suggested in a separate line of cases was to view 
business purpose and objective profit potential as factors that might 
inform the court’s analysis of whether the transaction meets the 15 
economic substance criteria, rather than taking a strict two prong 
approach.142  As the law developed, the common factor was that if the 
taxpayer could not establish that there was a non-tax benefit to the 
transaction, it would be deemed to have no economic substance.143 It 
has also been suggested that determination of economic substance may 20 
sometimes require a comparison of the tax and non-tax benefits.144  
This comparison is necessary because the taxpayer may sometimes be 
able to show legitimate business goals behind the transactions, but 
these benefits may be insignificant in relation to the tax savings 
received.  The uncertainty and conflict regarding the approach to be 25 
taken was one of the reasons behind insertion of the statutory GAAR in 
s 7701(o).145   
On the face of it, this approach appears to be narrower than the 
application of the New Zealand GAAR, because it only involves 
consideration of the economic substance of the transactions.  In Ben 30 
Nevis, the New Zealand Supreme Court held that a number of factors 
                                                        
139 Lerman v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 939 F 2d 44 (3rd Cir 1991) at [4]. 
140  T Christopher Borek, Angelo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart “Tax Shelters or 
Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the Economic 
Substance Doctrine” (2013) Discussion Paper No 747, Harvard Law School at 4. 
141 See for example Rice’s Toyota World v Commissioner 752 F 2d 89 (4th Cir 
1985) at 91-92. 
142 ACM Partnership v Commissioner 157 F 3d 231 (3rd Cir 1998) at 247. 
143 Borek, Frattarelli and Hart, above n 140, at 5. 
144  Karen C Burke “Reframing Economic Substance” (2011) 31 Virginia Tax 
Review 271 at279. 
145  Mik Shin-Li “Strictly Wrong as a Tax Policy: The Strict Liability Penalty 
Standard in Noneconomic Substance Transactions (2010) 78 Fordham Law Review 
2009 at 2019. 
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might be relevant to the question of whether a tax avoidance 
arrangement exists, and that the “the ultimate question is whether the 
impugned arrangement … makes use of the specific provision in a 
manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.”146   
Despite appearing to involve a much narrower analysis, the New 5 
Zealand and United States GAARS are relatively similar.  The economic 
substance doctrine has also been taken to be a rule applying the 
congressional intent and purpose when enacting the code.147  This is 
comparable to the parliamentary contemplation test as set out in Ben 
Nevis.  For example, in Coltec Industries Inc. v United States the 10 
economic substance doctrine was described as a “judicial effort to … 
prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative purpose of the tax 
code”.148  If the view in Coltec is accepted, then the United States 
judicial doctrine does not appear to be significantly different from the 
New Zealand rule. 15 
B The United States Statutory Rule 
A codification of the judicial rule was attempted in 2010 with the 
introduction of § 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code 1986.149  The 
key provision is:150  
 20 
 (1) Application of doctrine 
In the case of any transaction to which the economic 
substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be 
treated as having economic substance only if –  
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart 25 
from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic 
position, and 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such 
transaction. 30 
 
The statutory economic substance doctrine is further defined to include 
“the common law doctrine”, and the doctrine applies only to 
transactions that “[do] not have economic substance or [lack] business 
purpose.”151 That is, in order for transactions to be respected for tax 35 
                                                        
146 Ben Nevis, above n 85, at [109]. 
147 For example, in Commissioner v Court Holding Co, above n 138 at 334. 
148 Coltec Industries Inc v United States 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed Cir 2006) at 1353. 
149 The rule was introduced in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
2010. 
150 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(o)(1). 
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purposes, they must have both economic substance and a business 
purpose.  Section 7701(o) is therefore an explicit incorporation of the 
existing common law rule into statute.    
The definition of transaction in § 7701(o) includes a series of 
transactions.152  As a consequence, a case can be approached either 5 
from the point of view of one single transaction, or it can be 
approached by looking at the scheme as a whole when determining 
whether there is economic substance or not. 153   The court has the 
ability to disaggregate the steps involved unless the taxpayer can show 
that the individual steps contributed to an overall non-tax purpose that 10 
is consistent with Congressional intent.154 If there are multiple steps in 
a scheme, the step doctrine means that the court can view the scheme 
as giving rise to one single transaction, rather than breaking it down 
into multiple steps that the rule may or may not apply to 
individually.155 15 
The overall approach to be taken therefore is to first determine 
whether there was a transaction that the economic substance doctrine is 
relevant to, and secondly to apply the statutory provisions to determine 
whether the economic substance doctrine applies.156   
There are two statutory steps in applying the economic substance 20 
doctrine.  In order for the transactions to have economic substance 
there is first an objective test to determine whether the transaction has 
meaningfully changed the taxpayer’s economic position. 157   The 
second element is subjective, and requires consideration of whether the 
taxpayer had a substantial non-tax purpose for the transaction.158  In 25 
order to find that the transaction had no economic substance and is 
therefore void, one or both of these elements must be lacking.159 This 
clear statement of the two steps clarifies the common law position 
where it was questionable whether the economic substance doctrine 
had two or three steps.160 30 
Under the codified rule, a transaction’s potential for profit will only 
be taken into account if the “present value of the reasonably expected 
                                                        
152 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(o)(5)(D). 
153 Jansen, above n 133, at 35. 
154 Burke, above  n 144, at 276-277. 
155 Crenshaw v United States 450 F 2d 472 (5th Cir 1971). 
156 Stephanie Teitsma “Tax Practise in Bumper Cars: Bumping into the “Relevant” 
Hazards of the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine” (2011) 37 Michigan Tax 
Lawyer 25 at 25. 
157 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
158 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
159 Jansen, above n 133, at 29. 
160 Shin-Li, above n 145, at 2017. 
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pre-tax profit is substantial in relation to the present value of the 
claimed net tax benefits.”161  
1 Objective element: meaningful change to taxpayer’s position 
Under the objective element, there are two possible approaches.  The 
first is to determine whether any economic benefit was obtained.  This 5 
was the approach taken by the Federal Circuit in Coltec Industries v 
United States.162 The alternative approach is to look for the potential 
for profit, often defined as being potential for profit that is more than 
nominal.163  This must be done consistently with § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
2 Subjective element: substantial non-tax purpose? 10 
The courts have used at least seven different factors when determining 
a taxpayer’s subjective business purpose behind entering a 
transaction:164 
 
The following evidence has been considered by the courts: 15 
(i) whether a profit was even possible; (ii) whether the 
taxpayer had a nontax business reason to engage in the 
transaction; (iii) whether the taxpayer, or its advisors, 
considered or investigated the transaction, including the 
market risk; (iv) whether the taxpayer really committed 20 
capital to the transaction; (v) whether the entities involved 
in the transaction were entities separate and apart from the 
taxpayer and engaging in legitimate business before and 
after the transaction; (vi) whether all the purported steps 
were engaged in at arms-length with the parties doing what 25 
the parties intended to do; and (vii) whether the transaction 
was marketed as a tax shelter in which the purported tax 
benefit significantly exceeded the taxpayer’s actual 
investment. 
 30 
3 Penalties 
The onus is on the taxpayer to establish that the deductions claimed or 
the transactions in question have economic substance.165  If either of 
the elements of the economic substance doctrine are lacking, a strict 
                                                        
161 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
162 Coltec Industries Inc v United States, above n 148, at 1358. 
163 Sheldon v Commissioner 94 TC 738 (1990) at 768. 
164 Donald L Korb “The Economic Substance Doctrine in the Current Tax Shelter 
Environment” (remarks presented at the University of Southern California Tax 
Institute, 2005). 
165 Shin-Li, above n 145, at 2018. 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 38 
liability penalty applies.166 As it is a strict liability provision, it will not 
be relevant whether you intended to avoid tax or not.  However, it 
seems unlikely that there would be a situation of unintended tax 
avoidance that would fall within this rule due to the requirement that 
the subjective element of the two-part test is satisfied.  5 
C Application of the United States GAAR to the Parent Company 
This section will consider whether § 7701(o) and the economic 
substance doctrine could be used to counteract the Double Irish and 
Dutch Sandwich structures.  This analysis will proceed on the basis 
that the parent company is located in the United States. 10 
The first step is to determine whether there is a transaction that the 
economic substance doctrine could apply to.  Depending on the 
approach taken, the transaction in question could be defined in two 
ways.  First, it could be defined as the single licensing transaction 
where the parent company licenses its intellectual property to 15 
subsidiary B in return for low royalty fees.  Alternatively, the 
transaction could be defined as the scheme as a whole giving rise to an 
overall shifting of profits offshore. 
1 Application of the doctrine to the single licensing transaction 
If the transaction is defined as the single licence transaction to 20 
subsidiary B, the second step is to determine whether the economic 
substance doctrine applies.  In order to have economic substance, the 
transaction must have meaningfully changed the taxpayer’s economic 
position.  Under the view taken in Sheldon v Commissioner, the 
transaction did not result in an increased potential for profit that is 25 
more than minimal. The transaction did not create any new revenue 
making opportunities, nor did it reduce any expenses.  The only way in 
which profit was increased was through the reduced tax bill as a result 
of shifting the income stream, and it is clear from the wording of § 
7701(o) that the change in economic position must be more than a 30 
Federal income tax effect. 167  A similar result is reached using the 
economic benefit analysis proposed in Coltec Industries.168  It is likely 
that a court would find that the transaction in question has not 
meaningfully changed the taxpayer’s economic position. 
Where one element of the economic substance doctrine is not met 35 
the transaction will be ignored for income tax purposes.  In the case 
                                                        
166 Internal Revenue Code 26 USC § 6662(b)(6). The penalty is generally 20%, but 
increases to 40% where the transaction was not adequately disclosed. 
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that the above analysis of the economic position is not correct, the 
subjective element will also be considered.  The subjective element 
requires the court to look at whether there was a substantial non-tax 
purpose for the transaction. This will involve consideration of a 
multitude of factors.  For the single licensing agreement, the important 5 
factors are whether there was a non-tax business reason for the 
transaction, the separation or otherwise of the entities involved and 
whether the arm’s length principle was complied with. 
The intellectual property rights being transferred to subsidiary B 
were largely developed and protected in the United States.  If the 10 
intellectual property protection was not sufficient, this might be a non-
tax purpose for licensing of substantial assets to an overseas 
subsidiary.  However, the United States intellectual property regime is 
comprehensive and it is unlikely they would develop their inventions 
in the United States without sufficient protection.  This would indicate 15 
that there is no intellectual property reason for the licensing 
transaction. 
There is also no company law reason for the licensing agreement.  
The parent company has an existing company structure that can deal 
with the income and financial issues, indicating that the transfer was 20 
likely motivated by tax benefits.  It would be difficult for the taxpayer 
to make an argument that the transaction was not motivated by tax 
when the rights could have been used and exploited just as easily in the 
United States.  As with many of the arguments made in relation to the 
Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures, this step of the analysis is 25 
highly fact specific and the outcome could turn on the presence or 
absence of small details. 
In the case of a company such as Apple, there may be a foundation 
for an argument that there was a non-tax purpose for the transaction if 
the split of the local and international sales is taken into account.  30 
Apple has split their local and international sales since 1980, meaning 
that on-going licence agreements are merely a continuation of the split 
in assets.  There might be a stronger argument that the transaction has 
no business purpose if the company had historically carried out all 
their business in one place, and then suddenly shifted part of the 35 
business offshore with no apparent reason other than tax benefits. 
As described in Part V, the licence agreement is a transfer pricing 
arrangement, and must be done at arm’s length.  Exploitation of the 
arm’s length principle is another factor that may indicate that the 
taxpayer was not motivated by a legitimate business purpose.  In this 40 
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case, the parent company is able to exploit the arm’s length principle 
relatively easily owing to the previously described characteristics of 
intellectual property that make an accurate valuation extremely 
difficult. 
It is likely that a court would find that in the general structure 5 
described in Part II the taxpayer did not have a subjective business 
purpose behind the transaction.  The consequence is that at least one, 
probably both, of the elements required for a transaction to have 
economic substance would not be found, and the transaction would be 
void for income tax purposes. 10 
The final step in the analysis is the imposition of strict liability 
penalties under § 6662.  Assuming that the transaction is being ignored 
for tax purposes, the penalty provision would apply because there has 
been a substantial underpayment of tax.  The consequence of this is 
that the parent company would have to pay income tax on all its 15 
income, with a 20% penalty on top of that.  This would likely amount 
to a penalty in the millions of dollars and a tax bill in the billions for 
companies such as Google.169 
2 Application of the doctrine to the scheme as a whole 
An alternative analysis can be made taking the defined transaction to 20 
include the whole scheme.  This would include the setting up of the 
two Irish incorporated subsidiaries, the re-location of the centre of 
management of subsidiary B to a tax haven, and the licensing 
arrangements that allow the shifting of profits.   
When applying the economic substance doctrine to the scheme as a 25 
whole, many of the relevant factors were also factors in application to 
the single licensing agreement.  The analysis, therefore, is very similar. 
The only change in economic position arises because of the increased 
profits as a result of a decreased tax bill.  The argument here is even 
stronger because of the fact that subsidiaries S and N have no 30 
economic purpose other than to avoid paying taxes.  The income being 
received by them and funnelled to subsidiary B is the same income that 
would otherwise be coming into the parent company, and there are no 
additional products or rights being sold or used.  The presence of shell 
entities means the argument that there is no economic purpose is 35 
stronger when the transaction is defined more broadly. 
In the event that an argument could be made that the economic 
position has changed as a result of using the Double Irish and Dutch 
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Sandwich transactions, the relevant factors under the second element 
must be considered.  No arguments have been raised that might 
establish a non-tax business reason for the transaction, and the fact that 
at least one of the Irish subsidiaries and the Dutch subsidiary are shell 
companies would tend to support this view.170  The arguments raised 5 
earlier in regard to the transfer pricing agreements are also stronger in 
the context of the scheme as a whole because multiple payments and 
transfers are involved. The first royalty payment from subsidiary B to 
the parent company is significantly less than the payments from 
subsidiary S to subsidiary B, despite the agreements involving the 10 
same rights and products.  This is a strong indication that the transfer 
pricing rules are being exploited and this leads to a conclusion that 
there was probably not a substantial non-tax purpose for the 
transaction. 
The likely conclusion is that it would not make a difference whether 15 
the transaction was framed to be the scheme as a whole or the 
individual transactions, and that both would be found not to comply 
with the economic substance doctrine.  The consequence of this 
finding is that the parent company would have to pay income tax on all 
income, whether or not it was being received directly by the parent 20 
company.  They would also be obligated to pay a significant 20% 
penalty. 
3 Enforcement 
Similarly to the New Zealand rule, application of the United States rule 
would likely have practical difficulties in regard to enforcement.  The 25 
profits are sitting in an offshore account and a true representation of 
them may be difficult to determine.  Because the United States does 
not have double tax treaties with many of the true tax havens, the 
exchange of information that would facilitate the determination of the 
profits becomes much more difficult. 171 As the United States has a 30 
double tax treaty with Ireland, they would be able to receive 
information on subsidiary S, which is based in Ireland.  But 
information about subsidiary B would not be available, as it is not 
deemed to be an Irish tax resident.  The problem of this is that the 
income derived by subsidiary S would be clear, but any expenses 35 
incurred or deductions available to subsidiary B or the parent company 
                                                        
170 That is not to say that an argument of this nature could not be made.  Analysis of 
any structures of this nature is very fact dependent, and the outcome of each case 
will vary. 
171  The same is also true of New Zealand.  See Jillian Lawry Guide to Taxing 
Internet Transactions (CCH New Zealand, Auckland, 2000) at 1005. 
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would need to be taken into account when the authorities are assessing 
the income of the parent company. 
From the above, it becomes clearer that the transaction would need 
to be defined broadly as meaning the entire scheme.  If the transaction 
were defined narrowly as meaning the initial licence agreement only, 5 
no information about profits being made from the intellectual property 
would be available to the authorities when assessing the income tax of 
the parent.  The only avenue for altering the level of income tax would 
be for the authorities to re-value the assets being licensed under the 
arm’s length rule.  However, as discussed in Part III, there are inherent 10 
difficulties in accurately estimating the value of intellectual property 
unless the income received from it is clear.  A further limitation on any 
remedy gained under the arm’s length rule is that the transaction 
cannot take into account the profits made, only the strict value of the 
assets. 15 
The reliance on international cooperation and the enforcement 
difficulties faced by the authorities in regard to the taxation of 
multinational enterprises illustrates one of the fundamental flaws in the 
western taxation system.  The current tax system developed at a time 
where multinational enterprises were not common, and taxation was 20 
more straightforward.  As a consequence, the tax rules operate on the 
assumption that different entities of a multinational operate 
independently of one another. Technological developments mean that 
this no longer holds true, and it is likely that these multinationals are in 
reality operating as one global enterprise. 172  25 
  
 
A finding that the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures 
employed by many technology-based firms do not have economic 
substance could potentially have a flow on effect, regardless of the 30 
enforceability of the penalty provisions.  Large multi-national 
corporations rely on their branding and image to help maintain their 
profitability.  If the companies were seen to be not complying with the 
Internal Revenue Service, there is the potential for this to result in a 
public backlash of sorts.  An analogous situation arose in the United 35 
Kingdom when Starbucks were reported to have paid only UKP 8.6 
million in taxes over 15 years of trading, and none was paid in the last 
                                                        
172 Levin and McCain, above n 21, at 10. 
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three years.173  The resulting public outcry caused Starbucks enter an 
arrangement to repay UKP 10 million in taxes they had avoided. 174  
While this is clearly not a solution that should be relied on as it will 
come down to the decisions of each individual company, it is possible 
that compliance with the Internal Revenue Service might be provoked 5 
by public opinion on the matter. 
VI Does Use of the Commissioner’s Powers of 
Reconstruction Implicate the Separate Entity Doctrine? 
Both New Zealand and the United States have strong separate entity 
doctrines.  In general, a corporation is considered to be a separate 10 
legal person.  That is, the corporation and its owners or shareholders 
are to be treated separately at law.175  In order for either the New 
Zealand GAAR or the United States GAAR to be enforced effectively, 
the relevant revenue authorities will be essentially ruling that the 
income of one entity can be attributed to another entity. 15 
A New Zealand 
The separate entity principle in New Zealand is founded on the House 
of Lords ruling in Salomon v Salomon & Co, 176  holding that a 
company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders or owners.177 
Extension of this principle means that a subsidiary is considered to be 20 
a separate legal person from its parent company.  This is because the 
parent company is a 100 per cent shareholder of the subsidiary.  The 
consequence of this is that in order for the Commissioner to attribute 
the income of subsidiary B in the Double Irish or Dutch Sandwich 
structure to the parent company, they are essentially disregarding the 25 
separate entity status of the companies.  While the separate entity 
doctrine in New Zealand has traditionally been strong, there are 
several instances of the courts piercing the corporate veil to impose 
liabilities of the company on to a shareholder.178 
                                                        
173 Terry MacAlister “Starbucks Pays Corporation Tax in the UK for the First Time 
in Five Years” (23 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com>. 
174 MacAlister, above n 173. 
175 Douglas G Smith “A Federalism-Based Rationale for Limited Liability” (2009) 
60(3) Alabama Law Review 649 at 652. 
176  Salomon v Salomon & Co (1897) AC 22 (HL).  This is reinforced by the 
Companies Act 1993, s 15. 
177 Salomon v Salomon, above n 176, at 51. 
178 See for example Official Assignee v 15 Insoll Avenue Ltd [2001] 2 NZLR 492 
(HC). 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 44 
In the tax context, arguments relating to the separate entity doctrine 
and the corporate veil are often made implicitly.  In Russell v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Russell), the appellant contested the 
Commissioner’s reconstruction after it was found that the appellant 
had engaged in tax avoidance. 179   Initially, the Commissioner 5 
reconstructed the income of the relevant partnership and corporate 
entities to the appellant.  The appellant submitted that the company 
structure he used was entirely permissible, and that the Commissioner 
could not reconstruct the income in question to him because it was the 
companies that earned the income, not him.180 10 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the Commissioner’s broad 
powers enabled them to make this reconstruction.  The fact that the 
business structures were not used for genuine business reasons, the 
extensive financial consequences and the lack of tax paid by the 
appellant over the relevant time period were strong factors in favour 15 
of a finding that the income should be attributed to the appellant.181  
The appellant was the governing mind of the arrangements and was 
affected by the arrangement in a similar manner to the taxpayers in 
Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue.182  
The New Zealand courts have at times disregarded the separate 20 
entity doctrine, and there is tax precedent for attributing company 
income to the shareholders.  However, the Court of Appeal in Russell 
recognised that “it is not inevitable that a tax avoidance arrangement 
by a company will or should be attributed to a shareholder”.183 The 
indication is therefore, that whether the separate entity doctrine poses 25 
a problem for application of the GAAR will be fact dependent. 
The Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures have similarities 
to the arrangement in Russell in that they have extensive economic 
consequences, and the companies involved were completely 
controlled by the parent company that is the 100 per cent shareholder. 30 
Therefore, the separate entity doctrine is unlikely to pose a significant 
                                                        
179 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 128; 2012 25 NZTC 
20-120. 
180 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 179, at [68]. 
181 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 179, at [72]. 
182  In Penny, the Supreme Court emphasised that it is not the actual use of a 
company to arrange one’s affairs that gives rise to tax avoidance, but rather, it is the 
artificial way in which the structures are used .  See Penny v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue, above n 86, at [47].  In that case, the appellant orthopaedic 
surgeons transferred their business into a company, and paid themselves artificially 
low salaries.  The remainder of the income was distributed to family trusts in the 
form of dividends.   
183 Russell v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 179, at [74]. 
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problem for application of the GAAR to the parent company if a rule 
such as that in New Zealand were to be applied. 
B The United States 
Application of the United States GAAR is slightly more difficult than 
the New Zealand GAAR.  The difficulties with enforcement and 5 
information gathering, combined with the strength of the separate 
entity doctrine mean that it would be difficult for the Internal Revenue 
Service to bring a successful case under the United States GAAR. 
The separate entity doctrine in the United States has a sound 
historical basis, and it has been noted by the Supreme Court that 10 
“[l]imited liability is the rule not the exception”,184 indicating that it 
holds a fundamental role in corporate law.  Thus there is a strong 
foundation for an argument that the income of the subsidiary 
companies in the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures should 
not be attributed to the parent company.  However, the courts have 15 
historically recognised that in certain cases the separate legal status of 
the entities should be disregarded.185 
The strength of the separate entity doctrine is such that the 
corporate veil will only be pierced in rare cases:186 
 20 
Courts typically require the party seeking to pierce the 
corporate veil to demonstrate that there is significant 
shareholder domination and control over the corporation 
whose veil is to be pierced, that there is an element of 
fraud in the use of the corporate entity that warrants 25 
dispensing with limited liability, and that the fraudulent 
use of the corporate form has caused some injury to the 
party seeking to pierce the corporate veil. 
 
There is no strict rule on whether the corporate veil can be pierced, so 30 
any decision will be highly fact dependent.  However, the burden on 
the plaintiff to displace the separate entity rule is severe, and the 
courts are in general reluctant to pierce the corporate veil because it is 
an “extreme remedy, sparingly used.”187 
                                                        
184 Anderson v Abbott 321 US 349 at 362 (1944). 
185 This is often referred to as lifting or piercing the corporate veil.  The 
corporate veil sits between the company and its owners, and represents the 
separate legal status of the two. 
186 Smith, above n 175, at 657. 
187  Sonora Diamond Corporation v Superior Court 99 Cal Rptr 2d 918 at 922 
(1992). 
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In regard to the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich transactions 
described in Part II, it appears unlikely that the courts would be 
willing to pierce the corporate veil and attribute the income of the 
subsidiaries to the parent company. If the parent company wished to 
contest the Commissioner’s restatement of the company’s income, 5 
they would be able to make an argument that the strength of the 
separate entity doctrine prevents the Commissioner from making such 
a ruling.  
If the Commissioner wished to make a counter argument that they 
are entitled to make such a ruling, they would first have to show that 10 
there is domination and control of the subsidiary by the parent 
company.188  The nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship is such 
that the parent company will almost certainly be involved in the 
affairs of the subsidiary.  Thus, a stronger argument than basic control 
is necessary,189 and there should be evidence of the parent company’s 15 
involvement in the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary.190  Use of 
a shell company is evidence of this.  The shell company, for example 
subsidiary N, has no employees and cannot make any decisions for 
itself.  The parent company is completely running the affairs of the 
subsidiary. 20 
The second requirement is that there was a misuse or abuse of the 
corporate form equating to fraud or injustice. 191   That is, the 
corporation must exist with no other purpose than fraud.  The 
subsidiaries in question exist solely for the purpose of enabling tax 
avoidance and have no substantial business purpose.  Difficulties may 25 
arise at this step of the analysis if some of the subsidiaries are shell 
companies and some are not.  For example, in the specific structure 
used by Apple, Apple Operations International is a shell company 
with no employees, while Apple Sales International has 250 
employees and substantial offshore operations.  Therefore, generation 30 
of offshore income is done by both shell entities, and entities that have 
commercial operations.  This creates a difficulty because attributing 
only part of the offshore income to the parent company does not 
achieve the desired result. 
The final requirement is that the fraud or wrong must result in some 35 
type of injury to the plaintiff.192  The injury that the Commissioner 
                                                        
188 Smith, above n 175, at 657. 
189 Smith, above n 175, at 657. 
190 Sonora Diamond Corporation v Superior Court, above n 187, at 838. 
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would argue for is that they have received an inadequate amount of 
tax from the parent company and that the amount received is not an 
accurate representation of the income of the parent company.  This 
final step is also contentious.  It is not clear whether this would be a 
sufficient injury, as the standard for actual injury is typically high. 5 
The strength of the separate entity doctrine in the United States 
means that the Internal Revenue Service and courts are typically 
reluctant to attribute the activities of an affiliate company to the parent 
organisation.193  In the light of this, an argument based on the above 
analysis may be tenuous and unlikely to succeed.  As a result, the 10 
revenue authorities would potentially not want to intervene and 
attribute the income of the subsidiary to the parent company at risk of 
having their findings challenged. That is, the existence of the separate 
entity doctrine may be a factor in tipping a finely balanced case in 
favour of the taxpayer. 15 
C An Alternative Resolution for the Corporate Veil Argument 
Given the extent of the problem and the strong interest of the 
government in remedying the situation, a broader approach is perhaps 
needed.  The approach taken by the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd is an example of a formulation of 20 
the rule that might better fit this scenario if it were to be proposed by 
the Commissioner.194  Lord Sumption proposed a rule that:195 
 
… applies when a person is under an existing legal 
obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal 25 
restriction which he deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a 
company under his control.  The court may then pierce the 
corporate veil for the purpose … of depriving the company 
or its controller of the advantage they would otherwise have 30 
obtained by the company’s separate legal personality. 
 
This rule continues the theme of having a narrow formulation in order 
to best uphold the separate entity doctrine, while providing a clearer 
platform for parties to argue that the corporate veil should be pierced.  35 
An approach like this creates a favourable argument for the tax 
authorities to pierce the corporate veil as the company structures 
                                                        
193  George E Constantine “Recent IRS Determination Highlights Importance of 
Separation Among Affiliates” (2011) Association Law and Policy. 
194 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others [2013] UKSC 34. 
195 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and Others, above n 194, at [35]. 
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employed are deliberately frustrating the law.  This would enable the 
tax authorities to attribute the income of the subsidiaries to the parent 
company for income tax purposes. 
VII Conclusion 
The Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures used by large multi-5 
national enterprises raise several issues in relation to the nature of the 
western tax system itself.  Close analysis of the structures reveals that 
they are used to exploit the different bases of taxation.  In the United 
States, corporate tax is based on place of incorporation.  By contrast, 
the Irish tax system taxes companies on the basis of management and 10 
control.  This difference forms the foundation for a scheme which 
enables entities such as Apple Inc to shift its offshore operations to 
Ireland, and with the use of shell entities and internal transactions, 
they are able to avoid paying tax on billions of dollars of income.196 
Use of these structures causes significant problems from both an 15 
economic perspective, and also from the intellectual property point of 
view.  The companies in question typically argue that they are having 
a positive rather than negative effect on the economy.  This argument 
is based on the job creation, product development and services 
provided by the company.  However, despite an increasing GDP, 20 
corporate tax now forms a record low percentage of federal taxes.  
The consequence of this is that the government is missing out on 
valuable funds at a time where federal debt is at a record high. 
The Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich are also problematic from 
the intellectual property point of view.  One of the key justifications 25 
for providing intellectual property protection is that creation of rights 
and protection of products encourages innovation.  Shifting profits 
and some of the associated economic activity offshore results in a lack 
of connection between the state where the incentive to work is 
provided and the state where the profits reside. The result is that the 30 
Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich are exploiting both the tax system 
and the strong intellectual property protection provided in the United 
States. 
The key component of this paper was an analysis of whether a 
GAAR in the form of New Zealand’s or the United States’ could be 35 
used to take action against the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich.  
                                                        
196  In 2011, Apple avoided paying corporate tax on $22 billion of profits made 
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Analysis of the bare structures described suggests that it would be 
possible for the GAAR to apply in some cases, but that this is not a 
certainty.  Application of the GAAR is very fact specific, so the success 
or otherwise would depend on the exact facts at issue.  Factors that 
might tip the analysis in favour of the Commissioner include a sudden 5 
change in set up, use of shell companies, or repatriation of the funds 
that were previously residing offshore. 
There is also a practical difficulty in New Zealand with the 
application of the Commissioner’s powers of reconstruction.  Analysis 
of the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich revealed the difficulty in 10 
undertaking an accurate reconstruction of the income in question. 
Following this, application of the United States GAAR was also 
considered.  The economic substance doctrine was found to apply in a 
similar manner to the New Zealand GAAR.  At the most basic level, the 
transactions do not appear to have any economic substance, as the 15 
only change in economic position is as a result of the reduction in tax 
liability.  The transactions would therefore be ignored for income tax 
purposes. 
Application of both the New Zealand GAAR and the United States 
gaar revealed that framing the arrangement or transaction as the entire 20 
scheme would help form a more solid foundation for a case.  
However, in both countries, application of the rules is highly fact 
specific and would be difficult to ascertain. 
The final part of the paper considered whether the separate entity 
doctrine would be implicated by application of a GAAR.  This section 25 
reveals that the separate entity doctrine is stronger in the United States 
than in New Zealand.  As a result, application of the United States 
GAAR in a way that disregards the separate entity status of the 
subsidiaries becomes more contentious. 
The inability to make out a clear case for application of a GAAR to 30 
the Double Irish and Dutch Sandwich structures indicates that multi-
jurisdictional co-operation will be required if the negative effects of 
these tax practises are to be reduced.  The paper also illustrates one of 
the fundamental deficiencies in our current tax system, that is, the 
inability to regulate and control intangible resources and technology 35 
based transactions. 
  
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 50 
VIII Bibliography 
 
A Cases 
1 New Zealand 
Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] 5 
NZCA 40. 
Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Ors v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2000) 19 
NZTC 15,732 (HC). 10 
Case W33 (2004) 21 NZTC 11,321. 
Challenge Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1986) 2 
NZLR 513 (PC). 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Gerard [1974] 2 NZLR 279 (CA). 
Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1966] NZLR 683. 15 
Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] 
NZSC 116, [2009] 2 NZLR 359. 
Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1989] 2 NZLR 447 (HC). 
Hadlee v Commissoner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 (CA). 
Miller (No. 1) v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1997) 18 NZTC 20 
13.001 (HC). 
Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 1 NZLR 275 at 279 
(CA). 
Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 3 NZLR 316 (PC). 
Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95. 25 
Peterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (No 2) (2002) 20 NZTC 
17,761 (HC). 
Westpac Banking Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
CIV 2005-404-2843 (HC). 
 30 
2 United States 
ACM Partnership v Commissioner 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir 1998). 
Anderson v Abbott 321 US 349 (1944). 
Coltec Industries Inc v United States 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed Cir 2006). 
Commissioner v Court Holding Co 324 US 331 (1945). 35 
Crenshaw v United States 450 F.2d 472 (5th Cir 1971). 
Gregory v Helvering 293 US 465 (1935). 
Lerman v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 939 F.2d 44 (3rd Cir 
1991). 
Rice’s Toyota World v Commissioner 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir 1985). 40 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 51 
Sheldon v Commissioner 94 TC 738 (1990). 
Sonora Diamond Corporation v Superior Court 99 Cal Rptr 2d 918 
(1992). 
 
3 United Kingdom 5 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] UKSC 34. 
 
4 Australia 
Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 11 ATD 442; 
[1958] AC 450 (PC). 10 
 
B Legislation 
1  New Zealand 
Companies Act 1993. 
Copyright Act 1994. 15 
Income Tax Act 2007. 
Interpretation Act 1999. 
Patents Act 1953. 
Patents Act 2013. 
Trade Marks Act 2002. 20 
 
2  United States 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 2010. 
Internal Revenue Code 26 USC. 
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act 2013. 25 
 
3 Ireland 
Finance Act 1999. 
 
C Books and Chapters in Books 30 
Andrea Amatucci (ed) International Tax Law (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2006). 
Donald S Chisum and others Principles of Patent Law: Cases and 
Materials (2nd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2001). 
Hugh J Ault and Brian J Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A 35 
Structural Analysis (3rd ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2010). 
James R Repetti “The United States” in Hugh J Ault and Brian J 
Arnold (eds) Comparative International Taxation: A Structural 
Analysis (3rd ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2010) 173. 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 52 
Jillian Lawry Guide to Taxing Internet Transactions (CCH New 
Zealand, Auckland, 2000). 
Michael J Graetz Foundations of International Income Taxation 
(Foundation Press, New York, 2003). 
Philip W Grubb and Peter R Thomsen Patents for Chemicals, 5 
Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology: Fundamentals of Global Law, 
Practise and Strategy (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2010). 
Roy Saunders and others The Principles of International Tax Planning 
(Corpus Publishing, Gloucestershire, 2005). 10 
Victor Thuronyi Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 2003). 
William Cornish, David Llewelyn and Tanya Aplin Intellectual 
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (7th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010). 15 
 
D Journal Articles 
Andrew Thomas and Alex Faseruk “A Teaching Note on Offshore 
Financial Centres” (2012) Journal of Advancements in Business 
Education. 20 
Charles C Engel “Revisiting the Value Added Tax: A Clear Solution 
to the Murky United States Corporate Tax Structure” (2012) 22 Ind 
Int’l & Comp Law Review 347. 
Chris Evans “Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial 
Developments in Common Law Jurisdictions” 37 Hong Kong LJ 103. 25 
Denise R Johnson “Reflections on the Bundle of Rights” (2007) 32 Vt 
L Rev 247. 
Douglas G Smith “A Federalism-Based Rationale for Limited 
Liability” (2009) 60(3) Alabama Law Review 649. 
Erik M Jansen “Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Tax 30 
Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives” (2012) 57 St 
Louis U LJ 1. 
George E Constantine “Recent IRS Determination Highlights 
Importance of Separation Among Affiliates” (2011) Association Law 
and Policy. 35 
John J Cross “Taxation of Intellectual Property in International 
Transactions” (1988) 8 Virginia Tax Review 553. 
John Hickson “Corporate Migrations to Ireland” (2010) 36 Int’l Tax 
Journal 25. 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 53 
John Sokatch “Transfer-Pricing with Sofware Allows for Effective 
Circumvention of Subpart F Income: Google’s ‘Sandwich’ Costs 
Taxpayers Millions” (2011) 45 Int’l Law 725. 
John VanDenburgh “Closing International Loopholes: Changing the 
Corporate Tax Base to Effectively Combat Tax Avoidance” (2012) 47 5 
Val U L Rev 313. 
Joseph B Darby “Double Irish More than Doubles the Tax Saving: 
Hybrid Structure Reduces US, Irish and Worldwide Taxation” (2007) 
11(9) Practical US/International Tax Strategies 2. 
Julie Harrison and Mark Keating “New Zealand’s General Anti-10 
Avoidance Provisions: A Domestic Transfer Pricing Regime by 
Proxy?” (2011) 17 NZ J Tax & Policy 419. 
Karen C Burke “Reframing Economic Substance” (2011) 31 Virginia 
Tax Review 271. 
Karen C Burke “Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in 15 
Business Tax Reform” (2013) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 1329. 
Michael J Graetz “Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation” 
(2013) Colombia Law Review 347. 
Mik Shin-Li “Strictly Wrong as a Tax Policy: The Strict Liability 20 
Penalty Standard in Noneconomic Substance Transactions (2010) 78 
Fordham Law Review 2009. 
Philip Sancilio “Clarifying (or is it Codifying) the “Notably 
Abstruse”: Step Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax 
Code” (2013) 113 Columbia Law Review 138. 25 
Reuven S Avi-Yonah “Corporate and International Tax Reform: 
Proposals for the Second Obama Administration (And Beyond)” 
(2013) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 1365. 
Simon Loretz “Corporate Taxation in the OECD in a Wider Context” 
(2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 639. 30 
Stephanie Teitsma “Tax Practise in Bumper Cars: Bumping into the 
“Relevant” Hazards of the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine” 
(2011) 37 Michigan Tax Lawyer 25. 
Stephen C Loomis “The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas 
Tax Havens” (2012) 43 St Mary’s Law Journal 825. 35 
Steven A Bank “Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration: 
The Globalisation of Corporate Tax Reform” (2013) 40 Pepperdine 
Law Review 1307. 
Tyler M Dumler “Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and 
Effects of the Corporate Inversion Trend in the US and the 40 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 54 
Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate” (2012) UC Davis 
Business Law Journal 89. 
W Wesley Hill and J Sims Rhyne “Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: 
Global Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and Their Implications for 
The United States” (2013) 53(3) IDEA – The Intellectual Property 5 
Law Review 371. 
Xuan-Thao N Nguyen “Holding Intellectual Property” (2005) 39 Ga L 
Rev 1155. 
 
E International Materials 10 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (2013). 
Convention Between the Government of Ireland and Government of 
the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on 
Income and Capital Gains, Ireland-United States (signed 28 July 15 
1997). 
Directive 2003/49 on the Taxation of Cross-Border Interest and 
Royalty Payments in the European Union, OJ L 157, P. 0049 – 0054. 
 
F Newspaper Articles and Internet Materials 20 
Damian Paletta “With Tax Break, Corporate Rate is Lowest in 
Decades” (3 February 2012) Wall Street Journal <online.wsj.com>. 
Howard Gleckman “The Real Story On Apple’s Tax Avoidance: How 
Ordinary It Is” (21 May 2013) <www.forbes.com>. 
James Fryer “The Price Isn’t Right: Corporate Profit Shifting has 25 
Become Big Business” (16 February 2013) 
<www.theeconomist.com>. 
Peter Flanagan “How this Double Irish accountancy trick works” (27 
May 2013) <www.independent.ie>. 
Terry MacAlister “Starbucks Pays Corporation Tax in the UK for the 30 
First Time in Five Years” (23 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com>. 
 
G Unpublished Papers 
Donald L Korb “The Economic Substance Doctrine in the Current 
Tax Shelter Environment” (remarks presented at the University of 35 
Southern California Tax Institute, 2005). 
Jane G Gravellee “Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion” (2010) Congressional Research Service Paper 7-5700. 
T Christopher Borek, Angelo Frattarelli and Oliver Hart “Tax Shelters 
or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on the 40 
  Danielle Thorne 
  Laws 516 
 55 
Economic Substance Doctrine” (2013) Discussion Paper No 747, 
Harvard Law School. 
 
H Official Sources 
Inland Revenue Interpretation Statement: Tax Avoidance and the 5 
Interpretation of sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007 
(13 June 2013). 
Inland Revenue Tax Information Bulletin (Vol 12, No 10, October 
2000). 
 10 
I Speeches and Informal Sources 
Carl Levin “Offshore Profit Shifting and the US Tax Code” (Opening 
statement to the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 20 September 2012). 
Carl Levin and John McCain “Offshore Profit Shifting and the US 15 
Tax Code – Part 2 (Apple Inc)” (memorandum to the Members of the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 21 May 2013). 
J Richard Harvey “Testimony Before the US Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations” (21 May, 2013). 
“Testimony of Apple Before The Permanent Subcommittee On 20 
Investigations” (US Senate, 21 May 2013). 
 
